There are several ways to answer this, depending on what your purposes are.
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anonymity and central control
Tor is an open source anonymous file sharing and communication system. _If_ properly used, a good implementation of Tor will prevent sending nodes from being identified and traced, regardless of what content is made available. Especially if the nodes in a particular distribution chain are distributed across legal jurisdictions, this is about as good an assurance of anonymity as is currently available. Tor is only one of several approaches to the anonymity requirement.
Bit Torrent is a very clever way of distributing network loading across a large number of machines, and avoiding any central network controls of content or of the actual sharing itself. It was invented, implemented, and made freely available by Bram Cohen. It is a distributed (ie, non centralized) method of file sharing. There are several implementations of the basic algorithm, and several of these have formed a kind of 'community' around that implementation. Some are more 'commercial' and business like than others. Anonymity was not a design criterion and so there is no assurance at all of privacy. You may be unknown to interested parties, or not, and you can't know either way. Records on participating nodes may be kept for long periods (or not), and there is no way to determine which nodes retain information and which don't.
Centralized servers, like the original Napster (the current Napster is also centralized, but is largely controlled by its content providers, eg the record companies) are also available. Several are organized this way. These are inherently not private in that the central node(s) know all about participants and what they have downloaded. Some of these networks charge fees for access and for content (ie, the current Napster), some charge for copies of unencumbered software (eg, Kazaa for which the free version carries spyware and ads as an attempt to cover costs and make a profit) and rely on users to provide content, some don't charge at all. Some attempt to clear central data every , , , whatever, but this is not to be relied upon for those who have a concern for being untraceable. Any which charge will obviously have available a working link to an actual financial entity, though not necessarily the actual user if someone else can be gotten to pay the bills.
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content
Some peer-to-peer networks have acquired a good reputation for the variety and quality of content they provide. Others have not. But in every case in which end users supply content for sharing, there is a considerable opportunity for malware (eg, viruses, spyware, Trojan Horse software, ...) to be distributed along with (or in place of) actual content. As well, the content can be low quality (eg, low bit rate digitization of audio tracks, etc), regardless of any quality claim in an index listing. Considerable time and effort (and net bandwidth) may be wasted as a result. Users of such networks should become very well acquainted with 'defensive computing' (ie, use of malware detection and removal programs), and must _never_ let down their guard against it.
The only content which is inherently safe when acquired from just any source somewhere on a network is plaintext (ie, ASCII text or the Unicode equivalent). These are _not_ Word document files or any other sort of file format not readable by a simple plain text editor such as Windows' Notepad or 'vi', common on *nix systems. The only partial exceptions to this warning are such formats as R(ich)T(ext)F(ormat) which do not support programmable content such as macros. TeX and LaTeX are other examples. But, unilie TeX and LaTeX, RTF is specified and controlled by Microsoft; the next version may include programmable content, "for the user's convenience of course".
Note, _very_ carefully indeed!, that not all files with a '.txt' extension are actually plaintext files in this sense, and if so can contain almost anything. And so also for .rtf extension files.
Centralized content control networks, such as the current Napster, are something of an exception. A music track purchased from a record company on Napster (or soem similar network) is unlikely to contain malware. However, there are exceptions. Digital Rights Management schemes are regarded as malware by a substantial number of observers and they're quite common, and are likely to become more so. Sony/BMG included a Trojan Horse DRM rootkit for those who played any of several million CDs they produced and distributed in the last year or so. It installed itself silently on their computers. Sony claimed it was a DRM measure to protect it from illegal copying. Users unfortunate enough to have done so had their computers silently corrupted, and when the news got out in the fall of 2005, malicious crackers took only a few days to devise and mount attacks on computers compromised with this rootkit. Sony is currently being sued in several places around the world for damage to people's computers systems. Sony's attempts to provide a fix, after the issue became public, were ineffectual for the first few tries. They have finally attempted to recall the Trojan'd CDs and to offer unsubverted replacements.
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"good"
As may be seen, good is a term with a certain variability. Anonymity, in a censored world, may be a concern and is hard to arrange. Any Internet interaction will be traceable to a considerable extent, at one's ISP or Web site host, if nothing else. Cryptographic precautions (not easy to assure) can provide some protection during transit, but will be something of a warning flag for some observers, which is not likely to have been desired by many. Anonymous publishing/sharing is possible with some effort and care.
Quality of content on a network is both easier to determine, but also harder to ensure. If you suspect a low quality digitization of some music file, just examine it or listen. Time consuming in either case, unless you (or someone) write a script to do examine files automatically. And, with a sensible choice of virus and spyware programs (kept rigorously up to date -- no exceptions) and an invariable routine of checking each and every download for malware, malware dangers can be substantially reduced. But every network with user supplied content will be subject to change in quality and variety of available files over time, and as assorted legal initiatives work themselves out.
Yours is not an easy question to actually answer.
2006-06-25 07:06:26
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answer #1
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answered by ww_je 4
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