Cara Giuditta e cari answerini,
spero avrete la pazienza e l’onestà intellettuale di giungere al termine della lettura di questa mia risposta… Mi scuso per la lunghezza, ma è inevitabile per un’analisi approfondita e corretta.
Le prove di quanto è accaduto quella mattina non vanno ricercate tanto nello scenario che si è presentato sul luogo dello schianto, quanto nelle falle e nelle contraddizioni presenti nella versione ufficiale della Commissione 911, che ha indagato sugli eventi di quel giorno. E' sufficiente soffermarsi già sulle prime 50 pagine (un decimo del totale) per notare grossolane sviste e mancate spiegazioni...
Andiamo per ordine, seguendo la stessa versione ufficiale, che invito tutti a leggere!
1. STRANI CONTROLLI AGLI AEROPORTI:
"When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures." Il sistema si attiva cioè a Boston (da dove Atta parte per New Ark), ma non quando si imbarca da New Ark per Los Angeles sull'AA11 (il volo che colpirà la prima Torre al WTC)! Continuando la lettura si nota come il sistema si allerti anche per Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, e Majed Moqed sull'U175, senza vistose contromisure; ancora con Nawaf al Hazmi sull'A77 dove i dirottatori fanno scattare più volte l'allarme del metal detector: "We asked a screening expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the quality of the screener’s work to have been “MARGINAL AT BEST.” The screener should have “resolved” what set off the alarm; and in the case of both Moqed and Hazmi, it was clear that he did not."; e leggiamo infine che sull'U93 le telecamere di controllo non erano attive: "Like the checkpoints in Boston, it lacked closed-circuit television surveillance so there is no documentary evidence to indicate when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint, what alarms may have been triggered, or what security procedures were administered."
La Commissione ammette controlli marginali ed inspiegabili guasti alle telecamere di videosorveglianza, solo negli aeroporti di partenza dei voli destinati al dirottamento (infatti come si spiega che il CAPPS si attiva a Boston ma non a New Ark per M. Atta?)...
Il DUBBIO che sorge è: i dirottatori non potevano sapere di eventuali errori ai controlli, e per un piano di quella portata dovevano quanto meno ipotizzare uno scenario in cui tutte le contromisure avrebbero funzionato... in altre parole, se le cose avessero funzionato e i controlli non fossero stati marginali, non sarebbero neppure saliti a bordo di quegli aerei e tutto il piano sarebbe stato inutile ed inutilizzabile... Come potevano portare avanti da soli un piano in cui quelle piccole sviste (per 19 persone, e su 4 diversi voli in 3 differenti aeroporti... quindi sviste niente affatto scontate) erano in realtà fondamentali per il proseguimento del piano fino ai passi successivi?
2. STRANA CRONOLOGIA ED ERRORI DI COMUNICAZIONE:
>>A11. At 8:19, Ong reported:“The cockpit is not answering, somebody’s stabbed in business class—and I think there’s Mace—that we can’t breathe—I don’t know, I think we’re getting hijacked.” 8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the passengers. The microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers said,“Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.” Air traffic controllers heard the transmission. Alle 8.25 si viene a conoscenza che si tratta di un dirottamento, l'aereo si schianta contro la prima torre alle ore 8.46, 21 minuti più tardi, senza che i militari riescano ad intervenire. "The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on United 175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a minute." Esattamente 20 secondi dopo che il primo aereo colpisce il WTC, il secondo velivolo spegne il transponder e vira verso la seconda Torre, che colpirà alle 9.03. Il fatto che intercorrano quei 20 secondi fa pensare ad un'azione programmata e regolata minuziosamente, come se ci fosse una regia a dare istruzioni... i due aerei non potevano infatti comunicare tra loro! "A77 - Washington - LA. At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south. Two minutes later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost. The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repeatedly tried and failed to contact the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers also tried, without success. At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learned that communications had been lost with American 77." Avere due aerei scomparsi dai monitor dopo il primo attacco al WTC crea esattamente quelle condizioni di caos necessarie a ritardare gli interventi a causa di una confusione sui voli...
Il primo volo (American 11) viene (la Commissione non sa dire come e perchè) considerato erroneamente ancora in volo:
>>At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA:
NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?
FAA:Yes.
NEADS: On its way towards Washington?
FAA: That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower.That’s the latest report we have.
NEADS: Okay.
FAA: I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn’t the hijack at all then, right?
FAA: No, he is a hijack.
NEADS: He—American 11 is a hijack?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: And he’s heading into Washington?
FAA: Yes.This could be a third aircraft.
>>The mention of a “third aircraft” was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne. We have been UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF THIS MISTAKEN FAA INFORMATION.
Non è quantomeno SOSPETTO che i responsabili di un mancato intervento adeguato siamo inidentificabili?! e si liquidi la cosa in meno di due righe?! Ma non finisce qui:
>>During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93.
Sebbene tracciato dai radar si parte alla caccia del DELTA 1989 ignorando gli altri aerei non tracciati, come l'U93!
Ma un errore ben più grave viene commesso dai militari:
>>At 9:36, the FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington:“Latest report.Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. . . . Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.” This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters:“Okay,we’re going to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House.” He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed,but east over the ocean.“I don’t care how many windows you break,” he said.“Damn it. . . . Okay. Push them back.”
>>A “generic” flight plan—prepared to get the aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Langley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles.The lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight plan instruction to go “090 for 60” superseded the original scramble order. The Pentagon had been struck by American 77 at 9:37:46. The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away.
Viene intercettato l'A77 che andrà contro il Pentagono, ma si mandano i caccia da Langley alle coordinate sbagliate, invertendo 90 con 60... una cosa inconcepibile ed inaccettabile... ma qui considerata quasi trascurabile! E quindi non si riesce a fermare l'American 77!!!
Il DUBBIO è: ancora una volta i terroristi potevano sapere dell'esercitazione in Alaska e dei ritardi o degli errori di comunicazione affinchè riuscissero nel loro piano? Oppure era un piano così fallimentare che lasciava davvero cosi tanti elementi al caso e a coincidenze "fortunate" (per gli attentatori)... Nel secondo caso Allah funziona davvero bene!
>>At 9:53,FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft. Then the Command Center informed headquarters that controllers had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area. Within seconds, the Command Center received a visual report from another aircraft, and informed headquarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 was spotted by another aircraft, and, at 10:01, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 “waving his wings.” The aircraft had witnessed the hijackers’ efforts to defeat the passengers’ counterattack. United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from Washington, D.C. The aircraft that spotted the “black smoke” was the same unarmed Air National Guard cargo plane that had seen American 77 crash into the Pentagon 27 minutes earlier.
Non è STRANO che sia sempre e solo lo stesso velivolo ad essere testimone sia dello scontro al Pentagono, sia dell'U93 precipitato?!
>>It resumed at 9:37 as an air threat conference call, which lasted more than eight hours.The President,Vice President, Secretary of Defense,Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley all participated in this teleconference at various times, as did military personnel from the White House underground shelter and the President’s military aide on Air Force One. Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA, but they had equipment problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers. NORAD asked three times before 10:03 to confirm the presence of the FAA in the teleconference. The FAA representative who finally joined the call at 10:17 had no familiarity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decisionmakers, and none of the information available to senior FAA officials.
Non è STRANO che non funzioni proprio la comunicazione con l'FAA che aveva il compito di riportare i dettagli dei velivoli di modo che i militari potessero intervenire?!
>>On the morning of 9/11, the President and Vice President stayed in contact not by an open line of communication but through a series of calls.The President told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of time.The line to the White House shelter conference room—and the Vice President—kept cutting off. Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President’s chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room.
Altre comunicazioni ai più alti livelli che lasciano punti oscuri, necessari perchè l'A77 andasse a segno e perchè non ci fossero prove dell'ordine di abbattere l'U93... Si tratta sempre di CASUALITA'??!
At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft. His reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, “in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing.” The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage. The Vice President again said yes.
NEADS: Oh, he’s down? Down?
FAA: Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David.
NEADS: Northeast of Camp David.
FAA: That’s the last report.They don’t know exactly where.173
The time of notification of the crash of United 93 was 10:15.
Una nota del Rapporto della Commissione riferisce che gli orari delle comunicazioni della Casa Bianca (e solo quelle) hanno un margine di errore di 3 minuti... C'è un ordine di abbattere gli aerei dirottati tra le 10.12 e le 10.18... col margine di errore, l'ipotesi più calzante è proprio le 10.15, l'ora del crash dello United 93... un'altra COINCIDENZA?! Ed è una COINCIDENZA che precipiti proprio poco distante da Camp David?!
Quel margine di errore di 3 minuti lascia spazio proprio a quella versione della rivolta interna all'aereo, che la stessa Commissione 911 ritiene solo una POSSIBILITA', non una certezza!!!
3. INCONGRUENZE CON LE DEPOSIZIONI PRECEDENTI AL RAPPORTO DELLA COMMISSIONE 911.
In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16,NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect.There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well.The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records. Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense.The inaccurate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft. In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken information about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 was hijacked. It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost.Then, minutes later, NEADS was told that an unknown plane was 6 miles southwest of the White House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving directly toward Washington,D.C. Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to American 77, as testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one or two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washington, and the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help.They had been responding to a report about an aircraft that did not exist. Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would be implied by the account that it received notice of the flight’s hijacking at 9:16. By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed.
Non è SOSPETTO che si cambino gran parte degli orari dei fatti, affinchè la versione ufficiale stia in piedi? Come mai c'erano stati così tante sviste da essere corrette e come mai si dedica cosi ampio spazio nel rapporto a queste correzioni, mentre nn si analizzano altre incongruenze e sviste ben maggiori?
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Queste sono solo le prime 50 pagine, di 500!!! Mi scuso se riporto le frasi in inglese, ma è l'unica versione esistente... e dubito che l'abbiano letta in molti... Sorvolo sull'analisi dei video di quei giorni, per cui esistono molti documentari... sorvolo su ciò che si sa, come la mancata spiegazione del crollo dell'edificio 7 del WTC da parte della Commissione... Ciò che posso dire è che non dobbiamo stancarci di fare domande, non dobbiamo accontentarci della pappa pronta che ci danno, delle versioni ufficiali... non dobbiamo fare gli struzzi e pensare che se il piano dei terroristi abbia funzionato sia solo per un cosi gran numero di coincidenze simultanee... è impensabile orchestrare un piano a quei livelli, un colpo al cuore dell'America, facendo affidamento su così tanti fattori casuali che in realtà non dovevano accadere (se le procedure funzionavano a dovere)...
Chiediamo di fare chiarezza... ottimisticamente sono pronto a credere anche che "l'abbiano voluto lasciar succedere" (quindi non l'abbiano organizzato loro in prima persona, esattamente come avvenne con Pearl Harbor)... ma non mi stupirei di niente e non mi sento di escludere nessuna ipotesi, considerando i fatti... Sta di fatto che l'unica versione con più errori e con più “buchi” è proprio la versione ufficiale, e non è giusto, né per noi stessi, né verso i 3000 morti, accontentarsi e fidarsi di una ricostruzione appositamente piena di "insabbiamenti" e "punti in sospeso"...
Chi vuole dia uno sguardo anche ai seguenti siti: http://www.crisispapers.org/essays7w/22things.htm
http://www.wanttoknow.info/070618professorsquestion911
http://www.911podcasts.com/default.php?cat=9998&med=0&ord=Name&strt=10&vid=206&epi=0&typ=0
Chiudo con una domanda... Perchè se Bin Laden è considerato dalla Commissione 9/11 il responsabile degli attacchi, nell'elenco dei terroristi più ricercati, sul sito ufficiale dell'FBI, questo attacco non viene menzionato nel suo "curriculum"?! Aprite gli occhi... e leggetela la versione ufficiale prima di accontentarvi di risposte che UFFICIALMENTE neppure esistono ma vi fanno credere che ci siano!!!
>> La Verità è là fuori <<
2007-09-06 08:02:14
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answer #1
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answered by Anonymous
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